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Abstract 
This paper investigates the reaction of financial markets to the announcement of a business 
combination between software firms. Based on the theory of economic networks, this article argues 
that mergers of software firms should lead to greater wealth creation because of the network effect 
theoretically linked to the combination of software products. This hypothesis is partially supported, as 
only the targets in software/software outperform those in the other categories, yielding abnormal 
returns of great magnitude. In addition, we could not conclude that controlling position in the target 
enabled bidders to make the appropriate technological decisions to ensure the emergence of network 
effects in the portfolio of the new entity and create additional wealth for the shareholders of both the 
bidder and the target. Future research is needed to better understand the effect of the different 
properties of the software pooled inside the product portfolio of the new entity. 
Keywords : Merger and acquisition, network effects, software industry. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the acquisition of J.D. Edwards by Peoplesoft and the subsequent hostile bid by Oracle on the 
new entity, a wave of consolidation seems to be emerging in the software industry. In the wake of the 
post dot.com bust, many specialists of the sector have argued that the software industry is entering a 
more mature stage in which fewer large firms will dominate. Recent declarations by Larry Elison, 
CEO of Oracle, clearly illustrate the state of mind of some software firms’ executives regarding this 
industrial consolidation: “1000 tech firms must die!” 
In this context, it is the right time to investigate the potential of shareholder’s wealth creation 
associated with the business combination of software firms. Based on the theory of economic 
networks, this article argues that mergers of software firms should lead to greater wealth creation 
because of the network effect theoretically linked to the combination of software products. In addition, 
we put forward the hypothesis that the degree of ownership should influence the capacity of the bidder 
to make the appropriate technological decision to ensure the emergence of network effects in the 
portfolio of the new entity (and thus additional wealth for the shareholders of both the bidder and the 
target). 
2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
2.1 Measuring the wealth creation in merger and acquisition: the event study approach 
Over the last decades, shareholders’ wealth creation in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has been a 
matter of great interest in the financial literature. Different methodologies have been employed to 
investigate this phenomenon, but the most widely used is certainly the event study methodology.  
This methodology is grounded in the efficient market hypothesis stating that capital markets 
immediately account, in an unbiased way, for new publicly available information. When a significant 
economic event comes up, it is possible to assess its financial impact on a company by measuring the 
market performance of its common stock within a relatively short period surrounding the event. 
Performance is measured by the abnormal return of the asset price. This abnormal return corresponds 
to the actual return that the stock price achieved during the event window, minus the normal return of 
this asset. This normal return is estimated through a model calculating the return the stock should have 
had if the event had not occurred. For further details on the theoretical and empirical issues of the 
event study methodology, readers should refer to (MacKinlay 1997) and (McWilliams et al. 1997). 
In the case of mergers and acquisitions, the event study approach has been widely used because it is 
the most objective way to assess the a priori anticipation of the potential of an M&A. At the moment 
of the announcement, market participants estimate the current value of the incremental cash flow 
expected from the combination of the parties into the new entity. Based on this appreciation, trading 
decisions are made and the assets price of both the bidder and the target are readjusted. By measuring 
the abnormal returns, the event methodology aims at isolating the potential of the announced business 
combination, as perceived by the financial markets. 
Based on this methodology, a vast body of knowledge on mergers and acquisitions has been developed 
over the years. Despite some contradicting results reported in the 1970s and 1980s (mainly related to 
limited sample sizes), the following evidence has been substantiated by several authors (Agrawal et al. 
1992; Fuller et al. 2002; Jensen et al. 1983; Loughran et al. 1997): 
• The abnormal returns of the bidding firm are, on average, either slightly positive or nil. 
• The shareholders of the target firm benefit from large abnormal returns within a short event window 
surrounding the public announcement of the acquisition. However, large variations are reported in 
the returns, ranging from +10 to +30 depending on the sampled sector and the period under 
investigation (Jensen et al. 1983). 
 
In other words, market reactions to M&A announcements are generally favorable for the targets and, 
at best, slightly positive for the bidders. Yet, different empirical results have brought further 
explanation to the observed variance in the results. For example, gains are more important in tender 
offers than in mergers where cash (instead of share transfer) is used for payment (Loughran et al. 
1997; Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Datta et al. 1992). Bidders benefit from buying privately owned targets 
or subsidiaries, but underperform when acquiring public targets or when a multiple-bid situation 
occurs (Fuller et al. 2002; Loughran et al. 1997; Dodd et al 1977; Datta et al. 1992). Madhavan et al. 
(1995) denote an industry effect with regards to the information-processing load associated with 
analyzing events.  
To our knowledge, no study has specifically targeted the market reaction to the business combination 
of software firms. Nevertheless, related research on joint ventures and alliances in the information 
technology indicate patterns relevant to this study. Koh et Venkatraman (1991) conclude that markets 
react favorably to announcements of joint ventures in the information technology sector. Results from 
Das et al. (1998) indicate that technology-based alliances lead to higher abnormal profit than 
marketing-based alliances. From these results, markets seem to react favorably to the coming together 
of information technology firms. 
2.2 Network effects and wealth creation in mergers and acquisitions of software firms 
The main argument of this article is that the business combination of software firms should 
theoretically create wealth for shareholders for both the bidder and the target because of the potential 
network effect that arises from the combination of software products in one unified portfolio.  
An industry exhibits a network effect when “the value of a unit of the good increases with the 
[expected] number of units [to be] sold” (Farrell et Saloner, 1985; Economides, 1996). This 
paradoxical economic phenomenon emerges when the value of goods is directly linked to the installed 
base of the product. The greater the critical mass of users of a certain network of goods, the more 
value this product will have for the customers.  
The telecommunication industry is a classic example of a sector where network effects are determinant 
to the success of innovation. A phone has no value unless a telecommunications network exists, and 
other people own phones. In such a bidirectional network, the value of the network is equal to n * (n - 
1), where n represents the total number of phones in circulation. Any new phone subscriber will add 
2n to value of the network. 
In addition to traditional networks, Economides (1996, 2001) introduce the notion of virtual networks. 
A virtual network corresponds to a “collection of compatible components that share a common 
technical platform” (Economides, 2001). The DVD standard set up a virtual network for all DVD 
related products, i.e. DVD players and DVD disks. In a virtual network, network effect arises from the 
auto-reinforcing phenomenon that emerges within the complementary components. The larger the 
installed base of a certain component gets, the more value it represents to the complementary goods 
coevolving in the same virtual networks. This supplementary value will contribute to the larger 
diffusion of these complementary goods, which in turn will draw positive feedback to the other parties 
of the network. 
Software products exhibit properties that make them natural candidates for virtual networks. Two 
complementary and compatible software products can easily build upon each other to create an auto-
reinforcing context that would promote the diffusion of both products. Economics (2001) makes the 
case of Microsoft’s Operating System and the Office Application Suite that have clearly benefited and 
continue to profit from a significant network effect. 
The business combination of software firms has the potential of inducing new virtual networks or 
expanding existing ones. Take for example the acquisition of Great Plains (an enterprise software 
system provider) by Microsoft in 2001. After further development, the combined entity offers an ERP 
that is very well integrated with the MS Office suite (e.g., a manager using MS Project can easily 
export an updated budget into Great Plains’ accounting module). The complementarity and the 
 
compatibility within the extended Microsoft Portfolio contribute to the sales expansion of both the 
enterprise application system and project management software. 
Several authors have already covered the topic of relatedness and synergetic gains in mergers and 
acquisitions. According to Seth (1990), related mergers should benefit from one or more of these 
inductors of shareholders’ wealth: higher market power, greater economies of scale and/or scope, 
better coinsurance and enhanced risk diversification. Yet, conflicting results prevail regarding 
relatedness in mergers and acquisitions. Elger and Clack (1980) and Lubatkin (1987) find that 
conglomerate mergers create more abnormal returns for both the bidder and the target. Chatterjee 
(1992) reveals that market reaction is more important for unrelated targets than for related targets. On 
the other hand, Shelton (1988) brings to light the fact that supplementary mergers create more wealth 
than unrelated acquisitions. Singh and Montgomery (1987) report higher abnormal returns for related 
targets. Finally, Seth (1990) finds that both unrelated and related acquisitions create shareholders’ 
wealth. 
3. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
In the light of the theory of economic networks, the large percentage of unexplained variances in the 
abnormal returns of both parties involved in a business combination and the conflicting results of the 
relatedness literature, this article aims at answering the following research question: 
Does the business combination of two software firms create more wealth for shareholders than 
mergers with non-software firms? 
To answer this question, we propose the following framework of business combinations (See Table 1). 
In this framework, bidders and targets are respectively represented in vertical and horizontal axes. The 
framework is composed of 4 types of business combinations: A software firms acquiring a software 
target (1st Category), a software firms acquiring a non-software target (2nd Category), a non-software 























Table 1.  Framework of business combinations in the software sector 
The main argument of this paper is that, based on the theory of economic networks, the business 
combination of the software firms should lead to the creation of a virtual network and the emergence 
of network effects. This auto-reinforcing effect should translate to greater wealth creation for the 
shareholders of both the bidders’ and targets’ firms. Therefore, we pose the following hypothesis. 
H1:  The shareholders of both the bidder and the target of a business combination involving two 
software firms (1st category) will benefit from more important wealth creation than is the case 
for business combination involving non-software firms.Furthermore, the degree of ownership 
should influence the capacity of generating network effects. By acquiring a controlling 
position in a target, the bidder should be able to make the necessary technological decisions to 
ensure the complementary and compatibility of the new entity’s software portfolio. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is put forward. 
 
H2:  In the case of the business combination of software firms (1st category), higher controlling 
position should lead to greater wealth creation than that generated by the merger of non-
software firms. 
4. METHODS 
Data on mergers and acquisitions were obtained through Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum 
Database. This database records worldwide mergers and tender offers. For the purpose of this article, 
we selected the successful mergers and tender offers that occurred from 1980 to 2002. Acquisitions for 
which information had been leaked into the public domain before the official announcement (and 
therefore had lost the effect of surprise) were also discarded from the dataset. 
Mergers were classified according to the proposed framework. Bidders and targets were classified as 
software firms when their primary SIC code was 7371 (Computer Programming Services) or 7372 
(Prepackaged Software). Table 2 presents the total number of mergers and acquisitions per category. 
The fourth category obviously accounts for the greater number of M&A, while the second category 
(involving software firms acquiring non-software firms) is the smallest of all. From this selection, only 
the bidders and targets included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database were 








      
CRSP Bidders : 1440 CRSP Bidders : 39780 Non-software bidder 9203 M&A CRSP Targets : 280 357565 M&A CRSP Targets : 12213 
      






bidders 5243 M&A CRSP Targets : 174 4690 M&A CRSP Targets : 91 






Tables 3 and 4 present the distribution of the selected cases according to the degree of ownership of 
the bidder in the target firm after the acquisition. Stake position between 20 and 50 % appears to be 
the smallest of all three categories, while controlling position (> 50 %) is by far the most important. 
When looking at the distribution of M&A, important variances are observed in terms of the number of 
Degree of 
ownership Bidders Targets
< 20% 1953 5234
20 - 50% 1586 1369
> 50 % 39674 6155
Overall 43213 12758
Table 3.  Number of bidders and 
targets per degree of 
ownership 
  Software Non-software 
  Bidders Targets Bidders Targets
   
< 20% 88 129 1800 5063
20 - 50% 47 22 1520 1339








Sub-Total 1440 280 39780 12213
   
< 20% 26 17 39 25
20 - 50% 12 4 7 4






Sub-Total 1181 174 812 91
Table 4.  Number of bidders and targets per 
category and degree of ownership 
 
firms in each subcategory. On the one hand, the number of targets and bidders is unsurprisingly very 
high. On the other hand, equity position in categories 1 and 2 (software firms acquiring software firms 
or non-software firms), stake position between 20 and 50 % appears to be quite infrequent. This 
variance will require that particular attention be paid to the statistical power of the test realized in the 
next section. Statistical power, i.e., 1 minus the probability to reject the nil hypothesis when it this true 
(1- β) will thus be reported for every result. Cohen (1988) states that for a mature topic, statistical 
power should be greater than 80%. 
Event studies were carried out with Eventus software. A CRSP value weighted index was used for the 
market model estimation. Model estimation was made from 245 to 45 before the acquisition 
announcement. M&A with fewer than 145 days of data before the announcement were excluded from 
the analysis. Normal return of each firm was estimated with the standard approach:  
jtmtRjjjt )R(E ε+β+α= ; 
where )R(E jt is the rate of return expectancy of firm j on day t, α  is the intercept, β is the systematic 
risk of stock of firm j and mtR the rate of return of the CRSP value weighted index. Through the 
transformation of the previous equation, a firm’s daily abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the 
normal expected return from the actual observed return on the market:  
)R(R)R(ERA mtjjjtjtjtjt β+α−=−= ; 
where jtA is the abnormal return of firm j on day t. If t=0 stands for the merger announcement day, 
the average abnormal return ( AAR ) of a group of n firms for each trading day within the window of 
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The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) adds up the total returns within the window of 















where T1 and T2 are respectively the starting day before the event and the ending day of the window 
of analysis. 
Following the recommendation of McWilliams and Siegel (1997), short analytical windows were 
selected to limit interference from other events: -1 day to initial announcement (-1,0), -2 days to +2 
days (2,2) and -5 days to +5 days (-5,5). Considering a few days before the announcement helps to 
take into account the links that can be made before the acquisition is officially announced. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Overall results 
Table 5 presents the overall market reaction to M&A announcements. Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAAR) are tested against the null hypothesis that the event has not yielded a profit different from 
what the common stock would have generated if the event had not occurred, i.e., a 0 % CAAR. 
Our results are consistent with previous articles on the matter (Agrawal et al. 1992; Fuller et al. 2002; 
Jensen et al. 1983; Loughran et al. 1997): within a short analytical window, CAAR of the bidder stock 
is around 1%, while the target stock range is from 9 % to 13 % depending on the window analyzed.  
 
 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
 CAAR sig 1- β1 CAAR Sig 1- β CAAR sig 1- β 
Bidders 0.76% *** 1.00 1.12% *** 1.00 1.01% *** 1.00 
Targets 8.46% *** 1.00 11.83% *** 1.00 13.06% *** 1.00 
*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01    * p<0.05     t  p<0.01 
1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 5.  Cumulative abnormal returns: Overall results 
5.2 Merger and acquisition categories 
This first hypothesis states that, because of the network effect potential, software/software M&As (1st 
category) should benefit from abnormal profit of greater magnitude than other types of mergers (table 
6). To verify this hypothesis, this section compares (on a two by two basis) the CAAR of the first 
categories (software/software) to the CAAR of the three others (table 7). 
Contrary to expectations, bidders’ CAAR in a software/software M&A is not significantly different 
from zero. In other terms, the market appears to be indifferent to the announcement with regard to the 
bidders’ stock price. In addition, the bidders in the three other categories of M&A yield higher CAAR 
than the bidders in the first category. It should be noted that statistical power is lightly under .80 when 
comparing 1 vs 3 and 1 vs 4 in the [-1,0] window. On the targets’ side, the situation is completely 
different. Software targets involved in a software/software M&A benefit from the most important 
abnormal returns of all four categories with abnormal returns of up to 28.40 % in a period of -5 to 5 
days surrounding the event. With such a considerable yield, the target’s abnormal returns significantly 
differ from those of the three other categories. 
In the light of these results, H1 cannot be rejected on the targets’ side, while no empirical evidence has 
been found to support H1 on the bidders’ side. 
Moreover, it is also worthy to highlight the market reaction to the announcement of software/non-
software mergers (2nd category) and non-software/software (3rd category). On the bidders’ side, 2nd 
and 3rd categories present the highest abnormal returns, ranking respectively first and second within 
the four groups. As for the targets, these two categories yield comparable CAAR, ranking between the 
1st and the 4th categories. 
5.3 Degree of ownership 
The second hypothesis concerns the impact of ownership on the capacity to capture the network 
effect’s potential.  H2 states that software bidders acquiring a controlling position in a software target 
should benefit from larger abnormal profit than would be the case for mergers with non-software 
firms.To validate this hypothesis, we first need to look at the overall impact of the degree of ownership 
on abnormal returns. The following table aggregates the cumulative abnormal returns with regards to 
bidder’s ownership in the target after the announced transaction.  Analysis of variance reveals that the 
market reaction differs significantly between the three categories of ownership. As a matter of fact, for 
both bidders and targets, CAAR increases with ownership, reflecting the potential synergy that the 
new controlling owner can induce in the unified entity.  
Table 8 breaks down these ownership-based results into the four M&A categories. The first finding 
pertains to the fact that, on the bidders’ side, ownership does not impact the market reaction to 
software/software M&A: at every level of ownership, CAAR is not significantly different from zero. 
In addition, when comparing the CAAR results of the controlling bidders from the 1st category to its 
peers in the three other categories (see table 8), our findings clearly highlight that the latter benefits 
from much larger CAAR than the formers. However, for the categories <20 % and 20-50 %, statistical 
power is too low to formulate a definitive conclusion on this matter. 
 
   Targets 
   Software targets Non-software targets 
   -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
   CAAR Sig 1 - β1 CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β 
   
Bidder 













CAAR 11.14% *** 1.000 13.65% *** 1.000 14.78% *** 1.000 8.23% *** 1.000 11.59% *** 1.000 12.81% *** 1.000 
   
Bidder 
















CAAR 19.07% *** 1.000 26.55% *** 1.000 28.40% 
**
* 1.000 13.76% *** 1.000 15.61% *** 1.000 17.08% *** 1.000 
*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01    * p<0.05    t  p<0.01 
1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 6.  Cumulative abnormal returns per category 
 
  vs   vs   vs  
 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
 sig 1- β1 sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β 
Bidders *** .986 *** .925 *** .987 * .744 ** .827 *** .948 * .604 *** .981 *** .999 
Targets ** .389 ** .829 * .746 *** .843 *** .992 *** .985 *** .895 *** .999 *** .999 
*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01    * p<0.05    t  p<0.01 
1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 7.  Inter-category comparisons 
 
  -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
  CAAR sig 1 – β1 CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β 
< 20% 0.07%  0.09 0.21%  0.22 -0.15%  0.09 
20 - 50% 0.40%  0.37 0.81% *** 0.80 0.83% ** 0.64 





Anova *** ** ** 
< 20% 4.21% *** 1.00 6.22% *** 1.00 7.27% *** 1.00 
20 - 50% 5.61% *** 1.00 7.62% *** 1.00 9.66% *** 1.00 





Anova *** *** *** 
*** p<0.001    ** p<0.01     * p<0.05     t  p<0.01 
1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 8.  Cumulative abnormal returns per degree of ownership 
As for the targets in software/software M&A, the ownership breakdown illustrates the important 
variability of the results. The announcement of a controlling stake clearly leads to the most important 
CAAR presented in table 9 (with an increase of 31% in the [-5, +5] window). However, large 
increases in CAAR are also observed in the three other categories, leading to less difference in the two 
by two comparisons (table 10). Consequently, when taking only the transaction in which a controlling 
stake was acquired, comparisons between the 1st and 2nd categories as well as between the 1st and 3rd 
categories do not appear to reveal significant differences with regards to abnormal profit. It should 
however be noted that statistical power is not sufficient to conclude with 95% confidence that the 
difference is not significant. Yet, differences between the 1st and 4th categories still remain and show 
that mergers involving a software party do differ from the rest of business combinations. Based on 
these findings, H2 cannot be supported. 
6. DISCUSSION 
This paper put forward two main results. Only the target in a software/software M&A benefits from 
positive market reaction, and these abnormal returns are significantly higher than what targets earn in 
any other category of business combinations. Controlling position does lead to higher abnormal profit, 
but software/software M&As do not seem to take greater advantage than other categories of business 
combinations. The following paragraphs discuss these two results. 
6.1 Network effect of the target and the bidder 
High abnormal returns for the shareholders of the targets are not surprising. What is of interest in our 
results is mainly the fact that our findings help to explain a portion of the observed variance in the 
target’s abnormal returns. This paper has proposed the theory of network effect to explain the higher 
yield generated by the targets involved in software/software M&A. The market appears to recognize 
the potential for wealth creation associated with the introduction of the target software product into the 
portfolio of the bidders. 
The unexpected result is the finding that bidders in software/software mergers clearly underperform 
compared to bidders in the other categories. Not only is the additional value associated with network 
effect not taken into account, but the market appears to be on average indifferent to the business 
combination. One explanation for this phenomenon can lie in the expectation of the financial market. 
Because building a virtual network is the clear determinant of success in this industry, it is possible 
that the markets expect software firms to develop portfolios of complementary products. If so, the 
business combination is not a surprise event anymore, the incremental wealth already taken into 
account in the price of the asset. In this case, future research should try to assess whether the market 
penalizes firms that do not follow the path of mergers (e.g., reaction to unsuccessful merger attempts). 
 
Targets 
Software targets Non-software targets 
-1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
 CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β CAAR sig 1 - β 
    
< 20% -0.23%   0.067 0.10%   0.052 -1.42%   0.266 0.10%   0.140 0.25%   0.290 -0.06%   0.060











> 50 % 0.80% *** 0.902 1.18% *** 0.818 0.87% t 0.387 0.65% *** 1.000 1.07% *** 1.000 0.99% *** 1.000
< 20% 6.64% *** 1.000 6.85% *** 1.000 8.46% *** 0.996 4.11% *** 1.000 6.15% *** 1.000 7.19% *** 1.000




















> 50 % 18.82% *** 1.000 24.67% *** 1.000 26.31% *** 1.000 13.79% *** 1.000 19.10% *** 1.000 20.69% *** 1.000
    
< 20% -0.67%   0.087 -0.05%   0.050 -1.48%   0.094 -0.26%   0.060 -1.50%   0.270 -0.48%   0.060











> 50 % 0.06%   0.055 -0.45%   0.189 -1.78%   0.929 1.65% *** 0.980 1.75% *** 0.900 1.25% t 0.430
< 20% 6.93% ** 0.601 10.20% * 0.550 9.39%   0.269 10.25% ** 0.690 14.02% * 0.580 15.92% t 0.450
























> 50 % 20.84% *** 1.000 28.16% *** 1.000 30.96% *** 1.000 18.09% *** 1.000 19.69% *** 0.990 22.59% *** 0.99
*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01    * p<0.05    t  p<0.01 1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 9.  Cumulative abnormal returns per category and degree of ownership 
 vs   vs   vs  
-1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 -1,0 -2,2 -5,5 
sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β sig 1- β 
** .882 ** .898 *** .935 * .503 ** .794 *** .950 ** .539 *** .950 *** .999 
NS .112 NS .331 NS .251 NS .106 NS .130 NS .146 NS .998 *** .774 *** .796 
*** p<0.001   ** p<0.01    * p<0.05    t  p<0.01 1 Statistical power of the test (α = 0.05) 
Table 10.  Inter-category comparisons – Degree of ownership > 50 % 
 
6.2 Ownership and network effect 
Unexpectedly, results indicate that controlling position doesn’t seem to greatly affect the creation of 
wealth in software/software mergers. On the bidders’ side, financial markets are indifferent to M&A 
announcements whatever the level of ownership. It is possible that the same expectation phenomenon 
explains this indifference. Markets would anticipate the fact that only an M&A strategy that would lead to 
a controlling position in the target ensures the success of the operation (the other degree of ownership 
being penalized). 
As for the targets, their performance is not different from those in other mergers involving software 
(categories 2 and 3). However, the fact that all the targets in software-based mergers (categories 1, 2 and 
3) outperform significantly the targets in all the other mergers (category 4) is an indication of the 
importance of ownership in software mergers. Therefore, markets recognize that a controlling position is 
necessary to develop coherence and compatibility within the software-oriented product portfolio (whether 
only software or mixed with non-software product) of the new combined entity.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper was to investigate the reaction of financial markets to the announcement of a 
business combination between software firms. Based on the theory of network economics, we have tested 
the hypothesis that mergers between software companies should theoretically generate network effects 
that should translate into the creation of wealth for the shareholders of both the bidder and the target. This 
hypothesis was partially supported, as only the targets in software/software outperform those in the other 
categories, yielding abnormal returns of great magnitude. The second hypothesis related to the degree of 
ownership was not supported. Nevertheless, the targets in all the mergers involving software and for 
which a controlling position was acquired by the bidder outperformed the rest of the targets. This result 
appears to be an indication of the influence of the degree of ownership in mergers involving software. 
There are limitations to the above analysis. Because of the important number of mergers taken into 
account in this paper, it was not possible to control for confounding events that might have occurred on 
the same day of the events studied. CRSP database is also limited in terms of coverage outside the United 
States. Nevertheless, most of our tests exhibit high statistical power which brings support to the 
generalization of our results. 
Future research is needed to better understand the role of network effects in the creation of wealth for the 
shareholders of software firms involved in business combinations. One research direction that is actually 
under investigation looks at the different properties of the software pooled inside the product portfolio of 
the new entity. These properties might help to further our understanding of the network effects in the 
software industry. 
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